Introduction
In January 2007 a specially convened Sinn Fein Ard Fheis voted in favour of endorsing the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). The Ard Fheis motion committed the party to 'support the PSNI and criminal justice system' so that 'a civic policing service, accountable and representative of the community is delivered as quickly as possible' (CAIN 2007b) . The move was part of a choreographed process to re-establish devolved institutions in Northern Ireland. In the wake of the St Andrews Agreement that followed the formal ending of the 2 Irish Republican Army (IRA) campaign in July 2005, it was designed to entice the hard-line Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) into a powersharing executive. The move was nonetheless remarkable given the hostility that had characterised relations between Irish republicans and Northern Irish police forces (Ellison and Smyth 2000) -most notably the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) (replaced by the PSNI following police reform).
This article critically examines the evolution of the Irish republican policing narrative and posits that it can be conceptualised in four broad phases; passive rejection, 'Ulsterisation', disbandment and critical engagement. Conceptualisation into distinct phases is not to suggest that certain dominant themes do not pervade across phases. Instead of denying such fluidity the conceptualisation proffered herein highlights how 'frame elaboration' -essentially making certain aspects of a 'master frame' more central than others -(Snow, Tan and Owens 2013) was integral to how individual and collective narratives represented events on the ground at different phases of the conflict. The conceptualisation into different phases reflects how framing involves interaction and communication with other constituencies and the prevailing socio-political 'opportunity structures' that social movements mobilise within (Coe 2011) . So while Irish republicans may have always had an inherent degree of rejection across the phases (critical engagement apart) 'frame elaboration' reflects the different representations of why policing should be rejected that were birthed by interaction with changing state narratives, the changing role of the RUC throughout the conflict and the changing approach of Irish republicans towards the Northern Ireland state. The latter of these is of central importance given the inherent link between state legitimacy and policing legitimacy. The most notable examination of how Sinn Fein discourse was shaped by their increased tactical interaction with state structures 3 (in this case the courts and rule of law) was conducted by Kieran McEvoy (2000) . McEvoy observed how this strategic interaction came to ensconce itself more permanently as a constitutive element of Sinn Fein's post-conflict brand of Irish republicanism. This article aims to build on McEvoy's research through using the application of social movement theory to critically examine how Irish republicans altered their policing narrative to mobilise in response to the wider political environment of Northern Ireland and in tandem with their changing relations with the state. In doing so it offers insight into the strategic importance that underlines narrative framing and mobilisation in the face of a changing relationship with the state and its security apparatus. In drawing out these dimensions the article aims to look beyond narrative as outcome -essentially what the narrative imparts -to instead critically evaluate how narrative (re)framing is an inherently strategic process involving choreographed interaction with internal and external factors to manufacture a degree of political agency that can shore up overarching political positions. In short, it will trace how strategic (re)framing occurred every time wider political developments demanded a new narrative 'end point'.
Although social movement literature has rarely featured in political studies on Northern Ireland, a strong case exists for applying it to Sinn Fein because it evolved into a bureaucratic political party with a significant parliamentary presence having initially emerged as the political wing of a social movement birthed by communal resistance (Bean 2007: 52) . Before becoming 'a competitive actor in a political market place' it confined itself to anti-establishmentarian street politics of agitation and protest in support of the IRA (Tonge 2006) . Indeed, the mobilisation process itself substantively changed throughout the Sinn Fein evolution into a mandate-seeking constitutional political party. Mobilisation is the 4 process by which social movement entrepreneurs induce individuals into taking collective action (Gamson 1975) . It occurs when they successfully turn a sense of collective discontent into agency through the investment of time and resources to remedy this discontent (McCarthy and Zald 1977) . For radical social movements, like early Sinn Fein, this takes the form of public and/or violent protests against existing power structures (Raento 1997).
However, entry into constitutional politics seen Sinn Fein become a political party mobilising its 'community of resistance' to vote in favour of a new form of representational politics rather than encouraging social agitation by the 'community of resistance' itself (Bean 2007: 84) . Accordingly, mobilisation had evolved from getting bodies on the streets to publicly and violently oppose the state to getting voters to vote for Sinn Fein.
Before proceeding to a more in-depth methodological note certain caveats should be noted.
Firstly the article is not a narrative 'balancing act' but an empirical case study of the policing narrative constructed by Irish republicans. Insightful studies on policing narratives from other perspectives exist elsewhere (Lawther (2010) , Mulcahy (2000) and Brewer and Magee (1991) ). Secondly the article aims to examine how Irish republicans framed their policing narrative to mobilise on the issue of policing not to comprehensively or exhaustively study more nuanced political developments within contemporary Irish republicanism. Finally there are some within the wider Irish republican constituency that have not endorsed policing.
That does not diminish the examination of the evolution of the policing narrative proffered by Sinn Fein but rather provides an insightful examination into the strategic process of counter-framing.
Empirical data is drawn from two distinct sources. Primarily it is drawn from the archives of Irish republican publications like Iris and An Phoblacht and from localised newssheets and 5 Sinn Fein policy documents sourced via the Northern Ireland Political Collection at Linenhall Library, Belfast. This has been supplemented by original data drawn from semi-structured interviews with 30 community activists, political activists and former combatants across a broad spectrum of opinion within modern Irish republicanism. In order to create 'maximised comparisons' (Christians and Carey 1989: 367 ) the sample included interviewees of both genders, from several different urban and rural locations and from different (and no) political groups. Interviews were conducted on the basis of anonymity meaning that all 'person specific' information that may lead to identification (Wiles, Crow, Heath and Charles 2008) has been omitted. Data sets were analysed using 'thematic analysis' (Kohler Riesmann 2002) which effectively meant examining what was told rather than how it was told. This was then mapped onto a broad timeline of changing political developments in Northern
Ireland. This approach drew on Mulcahy's (2013) concept of 'signal events' -high profile events relating to policing in Northern Ireland that are useful for evaluating wider political changes. From this the four narrative phases of passive rejection, Ulsterisation, disbandment and critical engagement were deduced and further developed. As the aim of this article is to determine how and why Irish republican discourse on policing changed throughout the conflict and peace process, a 'signals event' framework is justified because it acknowledges the importance of the causality link between 'opportunity structures' and 'end points' in the (re)framing process. A change in macro-level 'opportunity structures' is reflected in change at street level reality ('signal event') which in turn forces a social movement to recalibrate its discourse accordingly (new 'end points') in order to successfully spur the collective into taking a certain course of responsive action ('mobilisation'). Applying empirical data to such a framework provides a deeper insight into under examined processes of Irish republican collective mobilisation and Sinn Fein party modernisation on the specific issue of policing. State and a political aspiration of rejoining this state (Farrell 1983) . The minority community also contained a smaller number of Irish republicans who shared this aspiration but gave articulation to it through the use of political violence. Although this violence was at most a questionable threat to the security of the state (Hanley and Millar 2009) , it allowed the Stormont government to direct now permanent 'emergency legislation' against the minority community as a whole (Farrell 1983) . A system of 'divided society policing' emerged whereby the dominant group took ownership of policing and criminal justice, while the minority community were alienated from this system (Weitzer 1995) . Walsh (1983:8) Stormont's Unionist government had a 'formidable internal security apparatus' to rule over the minority community through 'explicit coercion' (Ellison and Martin 2000) . Attuned to the wider implications of this in a society operating a 'divided society' policing model, the Irish republican narrative became shaped by 'boundary work' (Hunt and Benford 2004:443) distinguishing between 'them' who ran and defended the state and 'us' who were discriminated against. This helped to strengthen solidarity -defined as the 'identification of' and 'identification with' a particular group (Hunt and Benford 2004:439) -within the minority community. This was given succour by RUC misuse of legislation like the Flags and Emblems (Display) Act and the Special Powers Act to suppress cultural and political displays of Irishness (Farrell 1983) .
As the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) campaigned for reform of the exclusionary state in the 1960's, it was greeted with RUC heavy-handedness meaning that 'complaints about discrimination soon gave way to complaints about the RUC' (Ellison and Martin 2000) . It could be argued that this represents the first 'signal event'. An 'injustice frame' recognising RUC defence of the exclusionary state as a 'political wrong' (Polletta 1998) began to frame a narrative that tied the unacceptability of the RUC to the 8 unacceptability of the discriminatory 'Orange state'. Rejection of the RUC is predicated on its role as a 'private army for the Unionist party' (Republican News 1973). Policing, rather than being 'normal', is depicted as threatening to the minority community regarded by the state and its policing apparatus as a 'suspect community' (Hillyard 1988) . As political violence erupted in Northern Ireland amidst the attempted suppression of the NICRA campaign, the view of policing representing a political threat gained increased traction. RUC activity in combating political violence was presented as an extension of their role in suppressing minority community dissent (The Tattler 
Ulsterisation
The next 'signal event' was the emergence of state polices of 'Ulsterisation' -using the indigenous RUC and Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) to front counter-insurgency (Boyle, Hadden and Hillyard 1980:32) -and 'normalisation' -portraying the RUC as a 'normal' police force fighting 'normal' crime (Walsh 1983) . Two new 'end points' emerged; the RUC's 10 counter-insurgency role justified republican violence directed at it and this counterinsurgency function meant the RUC were not a 'normal' police force. To make these 'end points' 'adversarial framing' (Benford and Snow 2000) , portraying the Nationalist community as the 'good' victims and the RUC as the 'evil' oppressors was adopted. This (re)framing justified violence directed at the RUC and reified existing detachment from a police force historically regarded as threatening rather than 'normal'. Although the narrative exhibits continuity in terms of the core themes of sectarian, coercive and political policing, the expression of these tropes reflects a change in their manifestation from RUC violence against NICRA protestors to more aggressive and concerted counter-insurgency policing violence against the wider Nationalist community. The heightened selectivity of the framing process is integral to creating a sense of victimisation and to attributing blame for this victimisation (Benford 1997) . Using the onground impact of counter-insurgency policing, the Irish republican policing narrative created a sense of grievance within republican communities by depicting it as a symptom of ingrained sectarianism within the RUC-a task made easy by the force's predominant Protestant composition and ethos (Ellison and Smyth 2000) . The excesses of RUC counterinsurgency policing became 'loyalist harassment' doled out to Nationalists by 'loyalist gunmen' (Sceal 1986b) . Republicans argued 'the RUC are not a police body and will not be accepted as such... but will be viewed for what they are and what they represent -an extension of the loyalist paramilitary groups' (The Freedom Fighter 1976) . Constructing this narrative of victimisation had two discernible effects; it furthered the 'boundary work' of the passive rejection phase and it expanded beyond this by engaging in 'emotional work' (Hunt and Benford 2004: 447) . 'Emotional work' draws on emotion -in this case the anger and vulnerability inherent in victimisation -to reinforce solidarity within the collective. It then invokes 'moral emotions' to reign down moral judgement on an identifiable wrongdoer -in this case the RUC -in order to reinforce the outlook of the collective (Goodwin, Jasper (Plunkett 1987 ) and the supergrass trials (Delaney 1983 ) to (re)frame their narrative with 'moral shocks' (Polletta and Jasper 2001) . The intrinsic value of 'moral shocks' is twofold; they help to mobilise the collective to demand political action to change whatever wrong has shocked them and they appeal to a wider audience by drawing in peripheral sympathies (Jasper and Poulsen 1995) . The success of 'moral shocks' on both fronts in the Irish republican policing narrative is evident. Invoking 'moral shocks' meant that 'shoot-to-kill' communities. Collectives will struggle to mobilise on a given issue if there is a failure to make that issue relevant to the broader public (Marullo and Meyer 2004) . The prominence of media coverage on the Drumcree dispute, however, meant that RUC heavy-handedness was beamed across the globe, opening up the republican policing narrative not only to a domestic audience outside these immediate areas but also to an increasingly concerned international audience. The ability of the narrative to reach a wider external audience was also aided by the public consultation process that was rolled out across the North of Ireland Bean (2007)), the narrative depicts disbandment of the RUC as a precursor to any lasting political settlement. The RUC were no longer 'legitimate targets' but a 'core problem' to conflict resolution (Sinn Fein 1996) . While diagnostic frames may be reliant on being empirically credible for acceptance (Jasper and Poulsen 1995) , the reality is that the adverse impact RUC policing was having on the ground in Nationalist communities chimed with an As the new millennium dawned, the Irish republican narrative still exhibits disconnect from policing but had nonetheless moved beyond an absolutist position. This reflects the quandary of the 'inside/outside' position Sinn Fein had adopted post-GFA and post-Patten.
In accepting the GFA they had recognised the de facto legitimacy of the Northern Ireland state -albeit coated with a discourse of using its structures as a springboard for employing equality based reform to catapult them into a united Ireland (McEvoy (2000) , McGovern 18 (2004), Bean (2007) ). They were also actively legislating the rule of law in Northern Ireland's powersharing government. While they had rejected the Policing Act they had, however,
shown some tacit satisfaction with the Patten framework for reform (Murphy 2013) . Both of these created a fundamental change in the Sinn Fein position towards the state and policing that would require further strategic (re)framing to move beyond ideological absolutist rejection that no longer corresponded with their increased engagement with the postconflict state. The remedy to this quandary was to draw on wider post-GFA discourse to strategically (re)frame policing as an issue of reform and human rights rather than ideological opposition to 'British' policing or the 'Orange state'.
'Critical engagement'
Sinn Fein participation in the powersharing institutions created under the GFA birthed a discourse of equality based reform from within that was undermining the traditional How extensive or meaningful this consultation process was has since been questioned, exposing internal tension over party modernisation -a process where older, problematic ideological strands are refined to reflect contemporary societal reality through policy change that will appeal to more voters (Dommett 2015) . Given the natural unease involved in departing from previous positions, the process is most successful where there is strong internal discipline (Ozbudun 1970) . Critics of Sinn Fein party modernisation argue that it has been driven by deference to centralised authoritarianism (i.e. the diktats of the leadership) that was cultivated within the jails and then subsequently exported to Nationalist communities post-GFA (McIntyre 2008) . A system of managerialism thus emerged within the 'Sinn Fein state' (Bean 2007 ) that allowed the leadership to gain influence through the role former prisoners loyal to them played initially in funded local community structures and latterly through local government and assembly posts (Tonge 2006) . Accordingly, critics opine that the policing debate was an extension of this managerialism whereby mid-level local apparatchiks convinced the grassroots support base to rubber-stamp a predetermined leadership decision. The Sinn Fein leadership succeeded because they 'had surrounded themselves with people who were 'yes men' within the movement who would swear that Gerry Adams is the new messiah… you can see that clearly now when you look back and analyse situations' (Author interview September 2013). Consequently, the policing debate 'wasn't a real discussion within the Nationalist community' but a charade whereby the Sinn Fein leadership 'tried to say "we've consulted with our grassroots and they support it" but all these meetings were loaded with Adams' brown nosers' (Author interview June 2013). This (re)framing eased grassroots supporters into accepting the move. Accordingly 'critical engagement' is seen to be:
About all the things we have to change totally. The mindset, the structures, the procedures, the culture ... the only way to be changed is when people go into them and actually say 'no we're not doing it that way, we're doing it this way here' (Author interview June 2013).
The strategic (re)framing of the narrative to adhere to a wider political discourse justifying increased engagement with the post-conflict state helped to reaffirm to the collective that ideological advancement lies in 'participatory republicanism' rather than 'militant republicanism' (Tonge 2008:59) .
Noticeable too in this strategic (re)framing is increased emphasis on accountability. Given the historic lack of police accountability (O'Rawe 2008), (re)framing the matter in terms of an increased -perhaps even inflated -sense of accountability made the 'sell' an easier one politically. The strength of the accountability frame is evident by the fact that the Ard Fheis motion specifically stated the intention behind 'critical engagement' was that 'political policing' would be made 'a thing of the past' by Sinn Fein representatives on policing oversight bodies (CAIN 2007b) . The move was framed with 'zero sum' appeals that republican representatives on policing oversight bodies would 'remove another pillar of the corrupt state from enemy hands' and bring 'the arrogance of power to book ' (Sinn Fein 2007b) . By this stage policing was no longer deemed a political threat but a site of strategic 22 political struggle through which long term goals premised on equality based reform could be realised with a view to eventually achieving ideological goals in their totality. In addition to being intertwined with strategy, (re)framing also becomes intrinsically linked with agency in a new dispensation. By depicting the issue as one requiring pro-active Irish republican involvement, the (re)framing orientates itself towards an 'end point' that rather than rejecting policing on ideological grounds republicans must accept it on such grounds and match this with increased political agency. Sinn Fein's initial electoral appeal was that it represented a more radical threat to the status quo than the SDLP (MacThomas 1991) but post-GFA it is now premised on challenging the SDLP ability to deliver for Nationalists (Tonge 2009: 167) . By the time it had surpassed the SDLP in the polls, Sinn Fein had successfully used a discourse of equality based reform of the state to install itself as the primary defender of newly acquired Nationalist interests -at the surface level at least -less militaristic and more normalised policing, the counternarrative has been forced to reflect this. Rather than relying on widespread 'suspect community' harassment, as in previous phases, the counter-narrative has been tweaked to specifically reflect the discriminate harassment of republican activists. Continued 'adversarial framing' has birthed a victim centric narrative within the constituency that is broadcast externally and internally (Whiting 2012) . Like in previous narrative phases, this has imported human rights concerns from external audiences. The counter-narrative has duly adopted human rights groups' concerns about 'the policing you don't see' and lacunae in accountability mechanisms (Committee on the Administration of Justice 2012).
The combined effect of continuing to draw on these historic frames through counterframing is to challenge the Sinn Fein 'lie of "community based policing"' through exposing 'the reality of increased use of draconian legislation, harassment and brutality' (Poblacht na nOibrithe 2012). In seeking to make this 'end point' the strategic nature of narrative (re)framing again comes into focus. Counter-framing by anti-policing republicans has drawn strategically from two opposing approaches to the post-GFA state; the reformist insider approach of Sinn Fein and their own continued absolutist ideological opposition to it. The latter has relied on strategic interaction with the former to keep policing framed as a political threat thus reinforcing ideological opposition to the GFA, justifying 'spoiler' violence directed at the PSNI and fundamentally challenging the PSNI image as a community police service. In sum, then, strategically counter-framing their narrative with historic tropes 26 communicates that where the 'PSNI/RUC' are concerned 'the leopard does not change its spots and neither does the nature of British rule in Ireland' (Saoirse 2009 ).
Conclusion
In tracing the evolution of the Irish republican narrative on policing from a position of absolutist rejection to one of post-conflict 'critical engagement' this article has provided an insight into how master narratives must be examined beyond strict concentration on narrative as outcome. This is not to deny that the magnitude of change in terms of narrative as outcome is not in itself significant or worthy of sufficient examination. This case study has shown, however, that narrative (re)framing is a more expansive process than outcome because it is an inherently strategic, politically valuable means of keeping a grassroots collective base on board in constantly changing political landscapes. It allows narrative to communicate changing political strategies in their most base sense to the grassroots, thus creating opportunities for agency and mobilisation in response to altering political relationships with external state structures. Most notably, the process has been invaluable to managerailist party apparatchiks engaged in party modernisation designed to increase electoral charisma. Feeding into leadership self-images and rhetorical discourses, it locates specific policy change within this broader discursive territory opened up by changed 'opportunity structures' purportedly favourable to fundamental change. Proof of this is seen by the fact that the Irish republican policing narrative once framed by threat, injustice and 'moral shocks' has evolved to become framed by opportunity, accountability and community service, thus mirroring increased Sinn Fein involvement in the full political life of the post-GFA Northern Ireland state. Those once mobilised to violently oppose policing in Northern Ireland via strategic narrative (re)framing induced agency have now been similarly 27 mobilised to 'critically engage' with it. The counter-framing process engaged in by antipolicing republicans also speaks to the truth of narrative (re)framing being a process of strategic interaction with macro-level 'opportunity structures'. It reflects the causality link between 'signal event' and mobilisation, even if responsive agency is primarily driven by rejection of party modernisation processes rather than significant changes in state policy. In conclusion it can be seen that whether the narrative is (re)framed in favour of or against 'critical engagement' it has been adroitly constructed through strategic interaction with external factors that lie beyond the narrow confines of the Irish republican constituency.
